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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended), whereby a defendant in a district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from
a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first
degree or capital felony.

Mr. Christofferson was convicted by a jury

of Theft, a class A misdemeanor.

The Honorable Leonard H. Russon,

Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, presided over the trial and rendered final judgment
and conviction.

v

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

admitting into evidence the April 7 statement which the officers took
in violation of Mr. Christofferson1s right to counsel?
2.

Did the State violate its statutory and constitutional

duty to disclose evidence to the defense where it failed to inform
defense counsel of a later statement taken from Mr. Christofferson by
the investigating officer in which the State claimed
Mr. Christofferson recanted his April 7 statement?

vi

TEXT OP STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16 provides in pertinent part:
77-35-16. Rule 16—Discovery. (a) Except
as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall
disclose to the defense upon request the following
material or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements
of the defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the
defendant or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree
of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which the
court determines on good cause shown should be
made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all
disclosures as soon as practicable following the
filing of charges and before the defendant is
required to plead. The prosecutor has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.

vii

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880612-CA
Priority No. 2

WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404 (1953 as amended).

A jury convicted Mr. Christofferson

after a trial held on August 11 and 12, 1988. On September 27,
1988, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered judgment
and conviction.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 5, 1988, William Christofferson was arrested and
taken to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City (R. 122
at 2-3). In the early morning hours of April 6, Detective Hutchison
"Mirandized" Mr. Christofferson, then interrogated him (jrd.) . The
bulk of this interrogation concerned a burglary at the Edison School
(R. 122 at 10). However, at the end of the conversation,
Mr. Christofferson mentioned that he knew something about the theft
of an air compressor in Murray (R. 122 at 11). After the interview,

Mr. Christofferson was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail (R. 122
at 4) .
Sometime during April 6 or April 7, Mr. Christofferson
went before a judge to determine if he should continue to be held in
custody on the Edison School case (R. 122 at 14). He believed that
the court appointed an attorney to represent him during that
appearance (R. 122 at 7, 12 and 14). He remained in custody and the
State filed charges in the Edison School case on April 8 (R. 122 at
8).
On April 7, while Mr. Christofferson was still being -held
at the county jail, Detective Hutchison again informed
Mr. Christofferson of his right to remain silent or to consult with
an attorney (R. 122 at 9). Detective Christenson from Murray was
not present during the reading and discussion of rights but later
came in to interrogate Mr. Christof ferson (_I_d. ) . The sole topic of
discussion in this second interrogation concerned the air compressor
(R. 122 at 13). Sometime before the discussion of the air
compressor, Mr. Christofferson indicated that he had been to court,
had been appointed an attorney, and had not yet had an opportunity
to talk to the attorney (R. 122 at 4-5). No one asked
Mr. Christofferson if he wished to have his attorney present during
the questioning on the air compressor (R. 122 at 7). On April 11,
the State filed an Information charging Mr. Christofferson with
Theft, a third degree felony, in the present case, the Murray air
compressor case (R. 3, 21-22).
Mr. Christofferson filed a Motion to Suppress the April 7
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At trial, Detective Christenson

testified that, during this April 27 conversation, the Defendant
denied that he had taken part in the theft of the compressor,
although he had planned it with another person (R. 123 at 63-64).
Mr. Christofferson denied at trial that he had changed his story at
all during the April 27 conversation (R. 123 at 87).
Trial was held August 11 and 12, 1988 (R. 39-40).

At

trial, Mr. Christofferson renewed his Motion to Suppress his
statement (R. 123 at 58-59).

In addition, after Detective

Christenson testified that the Defendant had changed his story
between the first statement and trial, the Defendant objected that
he had never been given this information by the prosecution (R. 123
at 77). The trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
(R. 123 at 78-79).

Mr. Christofferson testified at trial that he

had taken the compressor as payment for work done for the victim for
which the victim refused to pay him (R. 123 at 82-85).

The jury

found Mr. Christofferson guilty of Theft, a class A misdemeanor
(R. 124 at 30).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting
Mr. Christofferson's April 7 statement.

The statement was taken in

violation of his fifth amendment right to counsel.
Mr. Christofferson invoked that right when he appeared in
circuit court on the Edison School burglary charges and again when
he made an ambiguous request by informing officers, after being
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ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY ADMITTING WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON'S
APRIL 7 STATEMENT TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT
TO COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT,
In Miranda v. Arizona, 3 8 4 IJ.S, 4 3 6 (19 6 6), the
stated:
[ T ] h e p r o s e c u t i o n in a y n o t u s e s t a t e m e n t s w h e 11 i e i:
e x c u l p a t o r y o r i n c u l p a t o r y , s t e m m i n g f rom
c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n of the d e f e n d a n t unless i t
d e m o n s t r a t e s the u s e of p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s
e f f e c t i v e to secure the p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t
s e 1 f - i n c r im i na t i o n.
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Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. These safeguards include a right to have
an attorney present at any custodial interrogation.

If the accused

indicates in any manner and at any stage that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
Although the accused may waive this right,
the mere fact that he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements on his
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain
from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents
to be questioned.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. Waiver will not be presumed from silence
or simply from the fact that a confession was
eventually obtained.
Miranda, 384 U.S at 475.
Thus, Miranda and its progeny created a rigid
prophylactic rule embodying two distinct inquiries.

Smith v.

Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (citations omitted).
First, courts must determine whether the accused
actually invoked his right to counsel . . .
Second, if the accused invoked his right to
counsel, courts may admit his responses to further
questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated
further discussions with the police, and (b)
knowingly and intelligently waived the right he
had invoked.
Smith, 469 U.S. at 95 (citations omitted).

See also State v. Moore,

697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985).
The two inquiries must be kept separate; evidence of
waiver may not be used in an attempt to show that no invocation of
the right to counsel has been made by the accused.

This is so
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Therefore,

[ u ] s i i lg ar I a c c u s e d ' s subsequent r e s p o n s e s t o c a s t
d o u b t on the a d e q u a c y of the initial request
itse1£ is e v e n m o r e i n t o l e r a b l e . N o a u t h o r i t y ,
and no'" l o g i c , p e r m i t s the i n t e r r o g a t i o n to
p r o c e e d . . , on h i s o w n terms and as if the
d e f e n d a n t had requested n o t h i n g , in the hope that
the d e f e n d a n t m i g h t be induced to say something
c a s t i n g r e t r o s p e c t i v e d o u b t on h i s initial
s t a t e m e n t that he w i s h e d to speak through an
a 11 o r n e y o r n o t a t a 1 1 .
S m i t h , 469 U . S . at 98-99
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however equivocal or ambiguous. Others have
attempted to define a threshold standard of
clarity for such requests, and have held that
requests falling below this threshold do not
trigger the right to counsel. Still others have
adopted a third approach, holding that when an
accused makes an equivocal statement that
"arguably" can be construed as a request for
counsel, all interrogation must immediately cease
except for narrow questions designed to "clarify"
the earlier statement and the accused's desires
respecting counsel.
Griffin, 754 P.2d at 968; quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 96 n.3
(citations omitted).
This Court adopted the third or "clarification" approach
outlined in Smith.
If the request is clarified as a present desire
for assistance of counsel, all questioning must
cease as if an initial unambiguous request had
been made. If, however, the accused, absent
police persuasion, indicates he does not want
counsel present at that time, the interrogation
may continue.
Griffin, 754 P.2d at 969.

The Griffin Court found that the accused

had made an arguably ambiguous request for counsel, when he said,
"This is a lie.

I'm going to talk to an attorney."

I_d. The

detective's response was found to be appropriate under the
clarification approach:
any more?"

"OK, are you saying you don't want to talk

Id.
Griffin established that "when an accused makes an

arguably equivocal request for counsel during a custodial
interrogation, further inquiry must be limited to clarifying the
request," 754 P.2d at 969.

On its specific facts, this Court found

that the appropriate clarification had taken place in Griffin.
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Tnomcson, 60_L, F.2d at 771. The accused

having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to
further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).

i. Mr. Christofferson Invoked His Right To
Counsel When He Appeared in Circuit Court.
Sometime on April 6 or 7, 1988, Mr. Christofferson
apparently went before a circuit court judge on a school burglary
case (R. 122 at 14). According to a transportation officer who
testified for the State, the morning after an individual is booked
into jail in Salt Lake County, the jail personnel transport that
individual to circuit court, where he or she appears before a
magistrate (R. 122 at 20). The purpose of the hearing is to
determine whether probable cause to hold the person exists and to
set bail.

Id.
While still in custody on April 7, after the hearing but

before Mr. Christofferson had an opportunity to consult with counsel
(R. 122 at 4-5), officers interrogated Mr. Christofferson concerning
the theft of a compressor in the present case (R. 122 at 9 and 13).
During the initial portion of that interrogation, Mr. Christofferson
informed the officers that a lawyer had been appointed to represent
him (R. 122 at 4-5). Detective Hutchison understood that
Mr. Christofferson had seen a judge on the other case (R. 122 at 12)
and that, although charges had not been filed on the other case, the
judge had appointed a lawyer to represent Mr. Christofferson (R. 122
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at 12-14).
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[A]n accused . . . having expressed his desire to
deal with the police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available
to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations
with police,
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).

This is true, even

when the invocation of the right to counsel occurs on a day previous
to the interrogation or when the interrogation is performed by an
officer unaware of the previous invocation.

451 U.S. at 478-79.

The rule does not change when the later interrogation
concerns an entirely different investigation from the one under
which the original invocation occurred.
As a matter of law, the presumption raised by a
suspect's request for counsel—that he considers
himself unable to deal with the pressures of
custodial interrogation without legal
assistance—does not disappear simply because the
police have approached the suspect, still in
custody, still without counsel, about a separate
investigation.
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.

, 100 L.E.2d 704, 715 (1988).

It

is immaterial that the reinterrrogating officer is completely
unaware of any request.

There is still

the same need to determine whether the suspect has
requested counsel[.]
Id. at 717.
Edwards applies, even if the original invocation occurs
"at the initial proceeding before the magistrate."
855 F.2d 702, 706 (11th Cir. 1988).

Cervi v. Kemp,

Such an invocation is valid as

to all subsequent custodial interrogations, even if the initial
proceeding concerned a charge separate from the subject matter of

the subsequent
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Even If Mr. Christofferson Did Not
Invoke His Right To (Counsel When He Appeared
In Court On The Edison School Charge, He
Nevertheless Invoked The Right When He Made
An Equivocal Request For Counsel Wh:Lch Was
igilored By The Officers :[nterrogating Him.

1 -3

On April 7, 1988, Detective Hutchison approached
Mr. Christofferson, who was being held in the Salt Lake County Jail,
and read him the Miranda warnings (R. 122 at 9). After the warnings
were read, Mr. Christofferson indicated that he had been to court,
that an attorney had been appointed to assist in his defense, and
that he had not yet talked with this attorney (R. 122 at 4-5).
Detective Hutchison did not respond to this statement by asking if
Mr. Christofferson wished to have that attorney present before
answering any questions (R. 122 at 7). Instead, immediately after
Mr. Christofferson's statement, Detective Christenson questioned
Mr. Christofferson about the theft of an air compressor (R. 122 at
13).
As an initial matter, the trial court, in its Ruling on
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, found that
interrogation occurred while he
[Mr. Christofferson] remained in continuous police
custody
(R. 34). Therefore, Miranda was implicated, and the trial court
should have considered the invocation prong of the test announced in
Smith.

469 U.S at 95. The trial court, in looking at the comments

by Mr. Christofferson concerning the alleged appointment of counsel,
focused on two areas.

First, on April 7, no charges had been filed

against Mr. Christofferson in either of the two cases, and,
therefore, no sixth amendment right to counsel had attached
(R. 34-35).

Furthermore, the claim by Mr. Christofferson that

counsel had been appointed "could not have possibly happened"
(R. 35), which, in the eyes of the trial court, further damaged the

sixth amendment claim.

Second, under the fifth amendment,

Mr. Christofferson had waived his rights under Miranda (R. 35).
At no time did the trial court engage in the first step
of the Miranda inquiry by looking at Mr. Christofferson's remarks
concerning the appointment of counsel as a request for counsel's
presence.

The remarks were dismissed as being factually impossible,

but this is irrelevant to the inquiry into invocation.

It is not

up to defendant to make some kind of formal
request. The Miranda case does not impose such a
requirement. A suspect may indicate his desire
for counsel in any manner.
United States v. Prestigiacomo, 540 F.Supp. 681, 684 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).

The trial court erred in jumping over this part of the two

part test and immediately checking for a waiver of the right by the
accused.
Invocation and waiver are entirely distinct
inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by
merging them together,
Smith, 469 U.S. at 98, or by ignoring one of them altogether.
Often courts have found questions about the right to an
attorney to be equivocal requests for counsel demanding immediate
clarification or cessation of the interview.
include:

Examples of these

"First of all how would I be able to get one, a lawyer?"

Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1179 (Alaska App. 1985); "Why should
I not get an attorney?" United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130
(5th Cir. 1984).

Obvious examples of equivocal requests include:

"Maybe I need an attorney," Moulds, 673 P.2d at 1083; or
" . . . might want to talk to an attorney," United States v. Fouche,
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776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).
Statements about the possibility of consulting an
attorney have also been considered equivocal requests.
these statements include:

Examples of

"I think I'll let you appoint me one,"

Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 538 (11th Cir. 1988); and "This is a
lie.

I'm going to talk to an attorney,"

Griffin, 754 P.2d at 968.

Although Detective Hutchison did not testify as to the
exact words used by Mr. Christofferson concerning the appointment of
counsel, he clearly remembered the content of Mr. Christofferson1s
remarks.

The detective acknowledged that, prior to discussing the

details of the two crimes, Mr. Christofferson indicated that he had
been to court, that an attorney had been appointed to represent him,
and that he had not yet consulted with that attorney (R. 122 at 4-5).
At the very least, these remarks were an ambiguous
request for counsel.

The remarks concerned appointment of counsel

and were similar to the inarticulately formed questions concerning
such appointment that were asked in Cherry or Hampel. Furthermore,
the remarks appear to be an ambiguous statement concerning the need
for counsel similar to the statements in Owen or Griffin.

Finally,

as in Fouche and Moulds, Mr. Christofferson appears to have been
wondering aloud if it would be wise for him to have his attorney
present.
Many defendants are not aware of the real scope of their
Miranda rights.
intimidating.

Furthermore, custodial interrogation can be very

Because of these two problems, an accused may not be

capable of invoking the right to counsel in anything but a vague

way.

Here, the best Mr. Christofferson could do under the

circumstance was to point out to the officer that counsel had been
appointed.

Because defendants cannot be expected to utter precisely

the right phrases in such a situation and
because the right to counsel is so fundamental, an
equivocal request for an attorney is to be
interpreted in the light most favorable to the
defendant.
State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265, 1268 (1984).

If such

requests are not clarified,
only those who are most assertive and articulate
would be capable of effectively exercising their
fifth amendment rights.
Hampel, 706 P.2d at 1180.
Despite the remarks by Mr. Christofferson concerning the
appointment of a lawyer to represent him, the officers did not
attempt to clarify Mr. Christofferson's remarks (R. 122 at 7).
Rather than clarifying the request, Detective Hutchison ignored it,
and Detective Christenson asked Mr. Christofferson about the air
compressor.

These actions and omissions created a violation of

Miranda, making the subsequent statement inadmissible.

B. AFTER MR. CHRISTOFFERSON INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO
THE PRESENCE OF AN ATTORNEY, HE NEITHER INITIATED
FURTHER CONVERSATION NOR WAIVED THESE PREVIOUSLY
INVOKED RIGHTS.
The burden of proving "that the accused actually
initiated the subsequent questioning11 is on the State.

State v.

Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265, 1270 (1984).
Further, even if a conversation with the
authorities is initiated by the accused subsequent

to his request for counsel, the burden remains on
the prosecution to demonstrate that there was,
under the totality of the circumstances, a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the fifth-amendment
right to have counsel present during the
interrogation.
Wright, 477 A.2d at 1270; citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9.
That burden becomes far more difficult, if not
impossible, to sustain when the record shows that
a request for counsel was made which was not
honored before questioning continued.
Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978).

This is true,

even when the request is arguably equivocal, because
questioning must stop if the defendant indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that
he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking.
Id; quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added by the Sixth
Circuit).
The State has not met its burden in establishing waiver
by the accused of his or her right to an attorney in a number of
situations beyond ignoring an equivocal request for counsel.

In

Wright, the mere fact that the accused did not initiate the
questioning by itself was enough to negate the State's showing.
A.2d

at 1271-72.

477

If the only evidence of waiver is the fact of a

subsequent confession, the State has not met its burden.
State, 573 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978).

Ochoa v.

And, if the

investigators attempt persuasion rather than clarification of the
equivocal request, waiver has not been shown.
P.2d 1173, 1182 (Alaska App. 1985).

Hampel v. State, 706

If the State does not meet its

burden by proving both that the accused initiated the contact and

that the accused waived his or her right to an attorney, the
confession is not admissible.

Ochoa, 573 S.W.2d at 801.

The record does not establish that Mr. Christofferson
initiated further conversations with officers after his remarks
concerning counsel or that he waived such previously invoked
rights.

The record shows that Mr. Christofferson's request was

ignored and that Detective Christenson immediately interrogated him
(R. 122 at 7, 9-10).

There is no evidence that Mr. Christofferson

did anything more than assert his rights, then respond to further
questioning.

This does not constitute initiation of the

conversation by the accused.
Furthermore, the trial judge found that the State, not
Mr. Christofferson, initiated the April 7 interrogation (R. 34).
The only possible evidence of waiver in the record is the
fact of the subsequent statement obtained by the accused responding
to further questioning and the fact that he did not continue to
insist on his right to the presence of counsel.

This is not

sufficient for the State to meet its "heavy burden" in proving a
waiver of Miranda rights.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.

In fact, once

an equivocal request is ignored, the State's burden becomes almost
impossible.

Maglio, 580 F.2d at 205. Here, State initiation of the

conversation is enough evidence to show that no waiver existed.
Wright, 477 A.2d at 1271-72. And, the mere fact of the statement
and lack of further assertion of the right is not enough to prove
the existence of waiver in light of all the other evidence.
Mr. Christofferson never waived his Miranda rights once he asserted
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them.

Hence, the April 7 statement was not admissible under the

fifth amendment and the trial court erred in allowing the jury to
hear it.

C. THE ADMISSION OF MR. CHRISTOFFERSON'S APRIL 7
STATEMENT WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Admission of a confession taken in violation of Miranda
requires reversal where the State cannot establish that the error
was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. Velarde, 734

P.2d 440 (Utah 1986) .
However, a determination that use of the
suppressed statement constituted error does not
end the inquiry. It is well established that the
admission of statements obtained in violation of
Miranda can be harmless error. Before federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, a court
must "be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In order to
make this declaration, "it is necessary to review
the facts of the case and the evidence adduced at
trial to determine the effect of the challenged
evidence "upon the other evidence adduced at trial
and upon the conduct of the defense . . . "
State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted).
The Thompson Court found reversible error based on the
use of the statement in the State's case-in-chief.
see also Moulds, 673 P.2d at 1085.

601 F.2d at 772;

In Owen, the Eleventh Circuit

found the error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, when the
admitted confession was the only direct evidence of intent in the
case.

849 F.2d at 540-41.

In addition, the admission of the

statement was found to have "impacted 'upon the conduct of the
defense,' by affecting the evidence that the defendant sought to

admit."

Id.
In the present case, the State cannot establish that

admission of Mr. Christofferson's April 7 statement was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State put on three witnesses in its case-in-chief.
Ben Chapman, a neighbor of the victim, knew only that the compressor
was missing after he and the defendant had done some work for the
owner (R. 123 at 51-52).

He did not know who took it, and he never

talked to Mr. Christofferson about the theft (R. 123 at 52).
The owner of the compressor, Dale Mitchley, had several
conversations with Mr. Christofferson concerning the theft.
Mr. Christofferson on each occasion denied having taken the
compressor (R. 123 at 21-22, 32 and 36). Mr. Mitchley gave no other
evidence on the identity of the person who had stolen his property.
The third witness was Detective Christenson, who testified as to
Mr. Christofferson's April 7 statement (R. 123 at 59-60) and later
retraction of that statement (R. 123 at 63).
Without the April 7 statement, the State had no direct
evidence that Mr. Christofferson was the perpetrator of the crime.
Nothing contained in the circumstantial evidence from Ben Chapman
created a greater likelihood that Mr. Christofferson had stolen the
compressor rather than Mr. Chapman.

The statement by

Mr. Christofferson that he had taken the compressor was most likely
the piece of evidence that swayed the jury.

It cannot be said that

the admission of that statement was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and Mr. Christofferson's conviction should therefore be
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reversed.

POINT II. THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
THE CONTENTS OF A POLICE INVESTIGATION WAS
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL TO MR. CHRISTOFFERSON.
A. THE PROSECUTION VIOLATED ITS STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO PROVIDE THIS EVIDENCE TO
THE DEFENSE.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(a) (1982) states in relevant
part:
the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon
request the following material or information of
which he has knowledge:
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, . . .
(5) Any other item of evidence which
the court determines on good cause shown
should be made available to the defendant in
order for the defendant to adequately prepare
his defense.
Evidence of an exculpatory nature as requested under
§ 77-35-16(a)(4) must be produced by the prosecutor, who also
has a constitutional duty to volunteer obviously
exculpatory evidence that creates a reasonable
doubt of guilt.
State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added).
If information is requested under § 77-35-16(a)(5),
disclosure is required only to the extent the court orders.
However, when the prosecution chooses to respond
voluntarily to a request under subsection (a)(5)
without requiring the defense to obtain a court
order, considerations of fairness require that the
prosecution respond to the request in a manner
that will not be misleading.

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987).

The Utah Supreme

Court has imposed two requirements on the prosecution in such a
situation.
First, the prosecution either must produce all of
the material requested or must identify explicitly
those portions of the request with respect to
which no responsive material will be provided.
Second, when the prosecution agrees to produce any
of the material requested, it must continue to
disclose such material on an ongoing basis to the
defense.
I_d. at 916-17.
[A]n incomplete response to a specific request not
only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but
has the effect of representing to the defense that
the evidence does not exist. In reliance on this
misleading representation, the defense might
abandon lines of independent investigation,
defenses, or trial strategies that it would
otherwise have pursued.
Id. at 917; quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985).

Failure to supplement discovery responses also has the risk

of
so mislead[ing] the defendant as to cause
prejudicial error.
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985).
Information that must be disclosed by the prosecution
involves more than the actual knowledge of the prosecutor.

In

addition, any failure to disclose is not rendered harmless because
the prosecutor in good faith was unaware of the information.
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984).
Information known to the police officers working
on a case is charged to the prosecution since the
officers are part of the prosecution team.

Id, (citations omitted).

Thus, the prosecutor has an obligation "to

search beyond his own file cabinet," Knight, 734 P.2d at 918, and
inquire as to the information known to his investigating officers.
In the present case, Mr. Christofferson requested in part
1. All police reports and investigations (R. 13),
and
4. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of
the defendant (R. 14).
See Motion for Discovery contained in Addendum C.

The prosecutor in

reply voluntarily offered the Information and a police report
(R. 15). Subsequent to this reply, Mr. Christofferson had another
conversation with Detective Christenson, the investigating officer
in the compressor case (R. 123 at 62-63).

The contents of this

conversation were not communicated to the prosecutor until the day
of trial (R. 123 at 62-64, 78). At trial, the detective
characterized Mr. Christofferson1s statement as a denial of guilt
(R. 123 at 64). The detective also claimed that Mr. Christofferson
implicated another person, Mr. Larson, in the theft (R. 123 at 64).
In addition, the detective testified that he used information
obtained from that conversation to obtain a search warrant (R. 123
at 63). Mr. Christofferson claimed he never changed his story
(R. 123 at 87).
The second statement was exculpatory evidence since it
implicated another person and retracted the earlier inculpatory
statement.

The State therefore had an absolute duty to disclose

this information.
Furthermore, even if this evidence were not considered

exculpatory information, it still falls squarely within the request
for police reports and investigations as requested under
§ 77-35-16(c)(5).

These materials must be information known to the

police but need not be contained in written reports.

See Shabata,

678 P.2d 785, 788.
The State had a continuing obligation to present this
information to the defense.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(b) (1953

as amended); Knight, 734 P.2 at 916-17 (there is a continuing
obligation for the State "to disclose material falling within the
scope of the agreement to produce . . . " ) ; Workman, 635 P.2d at 52
("the constitutional right of the defendant to a fair trial compels
disclosure of exculpatory evidence material to the preparation of
his case").
The State's somewhat creative "Answer to Defendant's
Request for Discovery" (R. 15) (see Addendum D) does not relieve it
of this continuing obligation to inform defense counsel.

First, the

State voluntarily complied with Defendant's request in point 1 of
the Discovery Motion and, under Knight, cannot thereafter limit the
response to the single report.

Second, the exculpatory nature of

this information required disclosure.
is ambiguous.

Finally, the response itself

Although the statement "[t]he defendant's general

request for discovery is denied . . . "

suggests that the State is

attempting to limit its responsibility to provide discovery, the
parameters of that limitation are not clear.

Having received a

police report outlining a statement by Mr. Christofferson indicating
that he took the compressor, defense counsel would reasonably expect

to receive information of any evidence of a recantation of that
statement.
It is immaterial that Mr. Christofferson was aware that a
conversation occurred between himself and Detective Christenson
since Appellant was not aware of the characterization of the
conversation by the State.

It is incorrect to presume the officer's

testimony to be true and, therefore, to presume that
Mr. Christofferson held the same impression of the conversation as
the officer.

See Knight, 734 P.2d at 922.

In Knight, the defendant was held not to know the
contents of the testimony of a former alibi witness turned State's
witness.

Denial of the duty to disclose the witness' statement by

the trial court presumed that the witness' testimony was the truth,
but in reality
the defense had no way of knowing what she would
say and could not prepare to meet it.
Knight, 734 P.2d at 922.

Similarly, the lack of disclosure

concerning the conversation misled the defendant into thinking
nothing occurred in that conversation that required a different
trial tactic or an effort to rebut or explain the characterization.
At trial, Mr. Christofferson's defense revolved around
his belief that he had a right to take the compressor.

This defense

took into account and explained the initial statement.

However, the

second, undisclosed statement during which the State claimed he
retracted the April 7 statement was not explained by this defense.
Furthermore, the second, undisclosed statement significantly damaged

Mr. Christofferson's credibility since it suggested that he had
changed his story in the course of the investigation.
Although defense counsel attempted to salvage the defense
through cross-examination of the detective,
The fact that defense counsel conducted vigorous
cross-examination is not proof that [he] was fully
prepared to meet [this] testimony.
Knight, 734 P.2d at 922. Counsel was not able to formulate the most
appropriate trial strategy and to completely prepare for
cross-examination because he did not know of the existence of this
information.

The crux of the State's case was the April 7

statement, and any harm to Mr. Christofferson's credibility needed
to be dealt with by his counsel through adequate pretrial
preparation.
Although the exact point in the proceedings at which the
prosecutor became aware of the second statement is not clear, it is
clear that he knew about it on the morning of trial, prior to
placing Detective Christenson on the stand (R. 123 at 78). See
Addendum E for transcript of argument and ruling on this issue.
MR. WALSH: Judge, I knew before he testified. I
knew this morning when we were talking about it.
I want you to understand. I didn't hear it for
the first time there. My recollection is I heard
it for the first time today when we were talking
about it.
Id.

A review of the morning portions of the trial record, when read

in conjunction with the prosecutor's acknowledgement that he learned
about the second statement during the morning of the first day of
trial, establishes that the prosecutor learned about the second

statement prior to opening statements.
The lunch break appears at R. 123 at 18. From the
beginning of opening arguments until the lunch break, no other
breaks were taken.

Hence, the State was aware of the second

statement and aware that it was information which had not been
disclosed to the defense (Prosecutor:
that."

"I learned myself today about

R. 123 at 77) prior to defense counsel's opening argument.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(b) requires the State to make

disclosures as soon as practicable after filing charges.

In this

case, the prosecutor had a continuing obligation to disclose the
information to defense counsel as soon as possible after learning
it.

During the period before trial in which he was speaking with

Detective Christenson, the prosecutor was under an obligation to
inform defense counsel as to police investigations.

The prosecutor

was aware that he had just learned the information and should have
immediately informed defense counsel before court resumed session.
Had the prosecutor informed defense counsel prior to
opening arguments, defense counsel would have been in a position to
ask for a continuance so as to reevaluate his case before the
damaging testimony was admitted.

Furthermore, defense counsel would

have altered his opening argument to take the second statement into
accounts.
In addition, the State had the opportunity to inform
defense counsel during the lunch break (R. 123 at 18). At that
point, only a small portion of the testimony of the first witness
had been elicited (Id.).

Had defense counsel learned of the

information during the break, he would have been able to discuss the
statement with his client or otherwise prepare during the lunch
break and would have been aware of the information when he
cross-examined the State's other witnesses.

The State violated

Rule 16 by failing to make a timely disclosure.
The State's violation of § 77-35-16 made adequate
preparation impossible.

The information was known to the

investigating officer on the case.

Any statement admitting or

denying guilt was material to the issues since the case revolved
around the April 7 statement in which Mr. Christofferson admitted
taking the compressor and Mr. Christofferson1s credibility.

The

reply to the discovery request showed that police reports or
investigations as a category had voluntarily been supplied; the
continuing duty to provide further reports in this category was
violated when the information concerning the conversation was never
disclosed.

Mr. Christofferson was misled by this limited reply

followed by the prosecution's failure to supplement its response.

B. MR. CHRISTOFFERSON REQUESTED RELIEF AS SOON AS
THE DISCOVERY VIOLATION BECAME APPARENT.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(g) (1982) provides further that:
if at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this
rule, the court may order such party to permit the
discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it
deems just under the circumstances.

-

OQ

-

Thus, it is within the trial court's power to fashion a remedy that
removes any threat of prejudice caused to the defendant by the
discovery violation.

Knight, 734 P.2d at 918.

The trial court has

this power as soon as the matter is brought to its attention.

If

the requested relief is denied or no suitable relief is fashioned,
an abuse of discretion may have been committed,

jld.

Such abuse

occurs when the relief requested would have "obviated this
prejudice," but such relief was refused and the relief granted was
inadequate to protect the substantial rights of the defendant.

Id.

at 918-19.
At trial, Mr. Christofferson objected to the testimony of
Detective Christenson based on the violation of discovery rules and
made a motion to dismiss (R. 123 at 77). The motion was denied, and
the court made no other effort to obviate the prejudice by
fashioning what it deemed to be more suitable relief (R. 123 at
78-79).

The dismissal would, of course, protect

Mr. Christofferson's right to a fair trial.

However, if the trial

court felt this relief was too harsh, it was free under subsection
(g) of 77-35-16 to fashion the more appropriate—and obvious—relief

of a mistrial.2

A mistrial could have been granted at this point

without prejudicing the State, and this could have protected
Mr. Christofferson.

The trial court declined to act in granting

relief once the discovery violation had been brought to its
attention and relief had been requested, thereby abusing its
discretion.

C. THE DENIAL OF RELIEF FOR THE BREACH OF
DISCOVERY CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.
For an error to require reversal, the likelihood
of a different outcome must be sufficiently high
to undermine confidence in the verdict.
Knight, 734 P.2d at 920. A "sufficiently high" likelihood is higher
than a "mere possibility" that the outcome would be different but is
substantially lower than "more probable than not" that the outcome
would be different.

2

Id.

The circumstances in this case are distinguishable from
those in State v. Larson, 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (filed June 1,
1989). In Larson, prior to trial, the trial judge indicated he
would consider a request to continue the trial if defense counsel
believed a continuance was needed to subpoena the witnesses in
question. Defense counsel made no such motion. In the instant
case, defense counsel first became aware of the statement when the
evidence was admitted during the testimony of the State's final
witness. Defense counsel had already presented his opening
argument, during which he acknowledged that Mr. Christofferson took
the compressor and also acknowledged that Appellant told Detective
Christenson that he had taken it (R. 123 at 6-7). Defense counsel
had already cross-examined the State's other witnesses and prepared
his case. Defense counsel did not become aware of this information
prior to trial, as was the case in Larson, and a continuance would
not have undone the harm caused by lack of information as to the
second statement. Nor did the trial judge suggest a continuance as
a possible remedy, as the trial judge in Larson had done.

[I]t is up to the State to persuade the court that
there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the
error, the outcome of the trial would have been
16. at 921.
The basis of the State's case was the April 7 statement
admitted over vigorous defense objection. Any defense available to
Mr. Christofferson had to rely in great part on his credibility and
on his explanation for that statement.
Appellant's defense was greatly impaired by surprise
testimony that Mr. Christofferson had, according to the police,
given a substantially different statement to the investigating
officer during the course of the investigation.

Mr. Christofferson

was unable to fashion an overall strategy in coping with the double
attack of a damaging statement and a belatedly revealed retraction
of that statement.

His lawyer was also unable to adequately prepare

to cross-examine the officer, whose testimony undoubtedly carried a
great deal of weight with the jury.

There was no testimony, other

than that of Detective Christenson, that tied Mr. Christofferson to
the crime.

Such lack creates a great likelihood that absent the

error Mr. Christofferson would not have been convicted.
P.2d at 922-23.

Knight, 734

The State cannot meet its burden to show that

absent the error there was no reasonable likelihood the outcome of
the trial would have been different.

CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons,
Appellant/Defendant, WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, respectfully requests

that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case for a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

/2- d^uof June, 1989.

*ADSMAW
Attorney for Defend^fe^Appellant

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this

/^-day of June, 1989.

c
JOAN C. WATT
DELIVERED by
this

day of June, 1989.
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ADDENDUM A

JUL 6 1988
- V-' Court

JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
430 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
NOTICE OF HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V.

WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON,

Case No. CR88-768
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON

Defendant.
The defendant, WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, through his attorney
of record, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby moves this Court to suppress
the statements made by the defendant, WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON, on
April 7, 1988.

The defendant moves to suppress these statements for

the reason that they were taken while he was in custody and after
the defendant had invoked his constitutional right to have counsel
appointed for him.

Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 40 CrL 2480

(1987).
DATED this

3^

day of June, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,

S cr'BRADSHAW
'
rney for Defendant

. s r~ —» r»

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
Please take notice that the above-entitled matter will be
heard before the Honorable LEONARD H. RUSSON at his courtroom on the
11th day of July, 1988, at the hour of 2:00 p.m.

Please govern

yourselves accordingly.
3D this
DATED

V)C/

day of June, 1988.

JAMES C.l BRADSHAW
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

day of June, 1988.

JUN
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ADDENDUM B

FILED IN CLEP.K'G OFFICE
Salt Lake County Lite:1,

JUL 1 4 1983
H Dixon Kindlgy Ck?rl; 2)1 C:ct Court

j y <TQ ,^<6Lu/ndl^/Ls

/

Oouty C<fcrk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

:

VS.

:

WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON,

CASE NO. CR-88-768

:

Defendant.

:

Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on for hearing on July
11,

1988, at which

time

testimony

was

received

along with

authorities relied upon by the parties, and the Court took the
matter under advisement.

The Court requested that counsel submit

to the Court a transcript of the tape of the hearing before the
Circuit Court, as well as the file in the case related to this
matter.

The Court has received the file, but not the transcript.

However, based upon the files and testimony received, the Court
can make its ruling without benefit of the transcript of the
Circuit Court hearing.
Defendant moves to suppress a statement he gave to the
police concerning theft of a compressor while being interrogated
concerning

a burglary.

He claims that his rights to legal

counsel under the Sixth Amendment had been invoked, as well as
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his rights to remain
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silent and to counsel under the Fifth

Amendment.
At

the

hearing,

Officer

Hutchison

testified

that

he

interviewed the defendant at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in
Salt Lake City on April 6, 1988, in regards to the burglary of a
school that had occurred the day before.
Miranda

rights, and answered

burglary.

Defendant was read his

questions concerning the school

Towards the end of the interview he was asked if there

were any other crimes he would like to clear up, and he stated
that he knew who took an air compressor in an unrelated crime.
Defendant was then booked.
The following day, on April 7, 1988, Hutchison, with a
Murray City Detective, again interviewed defendant.

Again, his

Miranda rights were read to him, and he was questioned concerning
the theft of the air compressor.

Hutchison testified that the

defendant reported that he had been to court, that an attorney
had been appointed for him in regards to the Edison school crime,
but that he had not yet seen that attorney.
stated

a

willingness

to

answer

questions

Defendant further
concerning

the

compressor crime, and at no time did he invoke his Miranda rights
to remain silent or to answer no further questions without advice
of counsel.
time,

Detective Hutchison testified that defendant, at no

invoked his Miranda

rights, nor did he ask for legal

counsel, or to refrain from answering questions until he had

STATE V. CHRISTOFFERSON

consulted

legal
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counsel.
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fact,

he

testified

of

his

willingness to talk without benefit of counsel.
Defendant takes the position that once he had been appointed
legal counsel, that he had rights that he could not waive in
regards

to

further

interrogation.

interrogation

unless

he

initiated

such

Defendant relies upon U.S. Ex Rel. Espinoza v.

Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987), and Arizona v. Roberson,
an unpublished United States Supreme Court decision, decided June
15, 1988.
The law as stated in both decisions is applicable in the
case before this Court.

In U.S. Ex Rel. Espinoza v. Fairman.

supra, the court stated:
The Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment each
provide a separate right to counsel in a criminal case.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person. . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . ." Although the amendment itself
does not speak of the right to counsel, the Supreme
Court held in Miranda v. Arizona. . . that it provides
"an individual held for interrogation. . . the right to
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during interrogation. . . . "
In addition, the Sixth
Amendment guarantee that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
In the Espinoza
weapons

charge,

questioned

and

concerning

case, Espinoza had been arrested on a
during

interrogation

a murder.

of that crime was

In regards to the weapons

charge, he had invoked the right to counsel under the Sixth

STATE V. CHRISTOFFERSON

Amendment.
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No such right was, or could have been made, in

regards to the murder charge since the State had not yet filed
charges «a*^ begun to prosecute him in that matter.

The above

court stated:
Although Espinoza had no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in the murder case at the time of the police
interrogation, it is clear that, as a suspect in police
custody, he did have a Fifth Amendment right to be
assisted by an attorney at the interrogation. However,
Espinoza did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right at
the interrogation. The only time at which he invoked
his constitutional right to counsel was at his
arraignment on the weapons charge, which occurred prior
to the murder interrogation.
We must therefore
determine whether Espinozafs invocation of his right to
counsel at his arraignment constituted an invocation of
his Fifth Amendment right.
If it did, we must next
decide whether Espinoza!s Fifth Amendment invocation
remained
in effect at the subsequent police
interrogation on the murder charge.
If so, we must
resolve whether Espinoza waived his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel at the interrogation.
We conclude that Espinoza invoked his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel; that this invocation
remained in effect because the custodial interrogation
occurred while he remained in continuous police
custody; and that because the State initiated the
interrogation, Espinoza was incapable of waiving his
right to counsel. f We therefore conclude that the State
violated Espinoza s Fifth Amendment right to counsel
and that, as a result, his confession was inadmissible.
This Court, likewise, holds that if, in fact, Christofferson
had invoked his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment in
regards to the burglary of the Edison school case, such right was
his during the interrogation in this matter, not only of the
Edison school case, but of the compressor theft case. The

STATE V. CHRISTOFFERSON
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interrogation occurred while he remained in continuous police
custody, the State initiated the interrogation and, therefore,
Christofferson

could

not waive his right

to counsel without

counsel being present.
If Christofferson had not invoked his right to legal counsel
under the Sixth Amendment, he still had his rights under the
Fifth Amendment which could be waived.
A review of State v. Christofferson, CR-88-652, the school
burglary case, the Court file indicates that the Complaint was
filed on April 8, 1988, and a Summons dated that date of the
warrant of arrest.

The defendant appeared without counsel for

arraignment in Circuit Curt on April 11, 1988, at which time the
court

appointed

defendant.

the Legal

Defenders

office

to represent

the

Attorney Bradshaw filed his appearance on April 12,

1988, and the preliminary hearing held on April 13, 1988.
Therefore, the interrogation by the Salt Lake City Police,
as well as the Murray Police, apparently occurred prior to the
Complaint being filed, and prior to defendant's appearance in
court without counsel, at which time legal counsel was appointed.
This being the case, and since the Sixth Amendment

right to

counsel does not attach until the State begins its prosecution,
and since the case involving theft of the compressor was not
filed until April 13, 1988, the police had a right to question
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Christofferson as long as he had been advised of his Miranda
rights and he had effectively waived the same.
Mr. Christofferson was given his Miranda rights, and did
waive the same, and did voluntarily talk to the police concerning
theft

of

the

compressor.

Therefore,

such

statement

is

admissible.
The defendant's Motion to Suppress is, therefore, denied.
The Court recognizes that the detective who interrogated the
defendant testified that on April 7, the defendant informed him
he had been to court and an attorney had been appointed who he
had not yet seen.

This could not have possibly happened, since

the court records indicate clearly that neither case was filed at
the time of or prior to April 7, and the defendant made no court
appearance according to the files until April 11.

The Court in

this decision relies upon the accuracy of the official court
files.

If, in fact, the hearing had occurred prior to April 7,

whether or not Christofferson invoked his Sixth Amendment rights
would depend upon what was said at the hearing.

If the defendant

had stated that he did not have an attorney and requested that
one be appointed, that would constitute an invocation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

If the defendant made no

request for counsel, and the Court noting he did not have one
simply appointed the Legal Defenders Office to represent him

STATE V. CHRISTOFFERSON
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that, in this Courtfs view, would not constitute an invocation of
the Sixth Amendment right.to counsel.
Dated this

/

ay of July, 1988.

NARD H. RUS&&T
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST
H. DiXOM KiNSL:;"-

, v ~C XAtJsn

rLU,US
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Ruling on Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, to
the following, this

/4

day of July, 1988:

Salt Lake County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James C. Bradshaw
Attorney for Defendant
430 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM C

KAREN STAM
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff

:

v.

FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

:

WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 881003172FS

:

COMES NOW the defendant, WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON , through
his attorney, KAREN STAM, and requests the following material be
provided to her as discovery no later than three days prior to the
preliminary hearing now set for the 27th day of April, 1988.
To-wit:
1.

All police reports and investigations concerning the

above-entitled case;
2.

All written or recorded statements of the defendant and

co-defendant(s), if any;
3.

The criminal record of the defendant or felony

convictions of any witnesses to be called by the prosecution;

. f r* <?

1

4.

All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the

defendant;
5.

All evidence tending to mitigate the guilt of the

defendant;
6.

All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the

offense for reduced punishment;
7 e < All physical evidence taken and all investigative
analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case.
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5)(b), the State
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to
plead.

z
DATED this [2

day of April, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,

KARE
ttorney for Defendant
Attorney

</

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Request to the Office of
the County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Suite #S3700, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84190-1200, this /a

—;day of April, 1988.
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ADDENDUM D

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: DAVID S. WALSH
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, Room #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3422

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

v.

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON,

Case No. 881003172 FS

Plaintiff,

Defendant.
The defendant's general request for discovery is denied in
accordance with State v. Knight, 734P. 2d 913 (Utah 1987), and
pursuant to Section 77-35-16 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
the prosecution provides copies of the following documents in its
prosecution file:
1.

A copy of the police report.

2.

A copy of the State's Information.

DATED this &b^

dav of April, 1988.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

DAVID S. WALSH
Deputy County Attorney
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ADDENDUM E

1

J

2

J

3

I

4

I

prosecutor.

5

I

the Court.

3 1

MR* WALSH:

I suspect whatever the entry is is

down in microfiche.
THE COURT:

That is your job, you are the

It is your job to present the evidence to
I will so rule that before the prosecutor

can cross examine on these prior crimes, that he must have

7

i

an^in hand sufficient evidence of the convictions.

8

]

Certainly the Court file, the original Court file that

9 I

has within it a conviction or a certified copy of that
conviction.

10

Any other questions for the Court?

MR. BRADSHAW:

11

Your Honor, I also wanted the

benefit of the record to indicate my position to dismiss

12
3

,

and that would be based on the failure of the State to

14

I

provide exculpatory evidence.

The statement of

15 I

Christofferson, apparently my client made an exculpatory

16 I

statement that he did not commit the offense.

1? I

Court, I think can see from the State's evidence, the case

As the

18 I rests and falls, the evidence is based upon my client's
19 J

statement.

The fact that he made an exculpatory statement

20 I that retracted his earlier statement, I think it clearly
21 I should have been provided to me and I submit under
22 J Brady v s . Maryland, the failure to provide the exculpatory
23 I evidence should warrant dismissal.
2* I
25

I that.

MR. WALSH:

Judge, I learned myself today about

I believe when we had the prior hearing the officer

77

testified he made a similar statement to hinu

Mr. Bradshaw

has been aware since that earlier hearing that
Mr. Christofferson has changed positions on this in his
involvement in this case from the beginning.

I was not

aware of that until today myself, and so to say this case
should be dismissed for that reason is asking a lot for
something that there has been no violation of, Judge.
I don't see that there has been any violation whatsoever.
THE COURT:

Mr. Bradshaw, anything further?

MR. BRADSHAW:

I would submit it, Your Honor,

and to clear up the record that there was no indication
at the Preliminary Hearing of that statement.
THE COURT:

The motion is denied.

Apparently,

this was information that was not contained in any of the
investigative reports or in the mind of the prosecutor,
he himself, did not know about it until today.

Apparently,

this was some information that came out during examination
of the officer.

I am going to rule that the law has not

been violated in this regard and the motion is denied.
MR. WALSH:

Judge, I knew before he testified.

I knew this morning when we were talking about it. I
want you to understand.
time there.

I didn't hear it for the first

My recollection is I heard it for the first

time today when we were talking about it.
THE COURT:

My ruling remains the same and let

78

the record so show.

Okay, bring in the jury.

(Jury returned to the courtroom.)
THE COURT:
returned.

Let the record show the jury has

Occasionally, ladies and gentlemen, we have

matters.that come up that take a lot of time and we
appreciate your patience, and now you are back with us.
We can continue on.

You may continue.

MR. WALSH:

Judge, the State rests.

THE COURT:

The State rests.

MR. BRADSHAW:

Mr. Bradshaw.

Thank you, Your Honor. We

would call Bill Christofferson to the stand.
WILLIAM CHRISTOFFERSON
Called as a witness on his own behalf, after having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BRADSHAW:
Q

Bill, could you please tell us your full name.

A

My name is William C. Christofferson.

Q

You go by Bill?

A

Yeah.

Q

Where do you presently live?

A

I am at ATC right now, is AL's Treatment Center.

Q

How long have you been there?

A

About two and a half weeks.

Q

During 1987 and 1988, did you live with

